In March 2002, the United States imposed temporary safeguard measures on 11 steel products in the forms of higher tariffs and tariff-rate quotas. Using a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, we evaluate the effects of U.S. safeguards on economic welfare, real GDP, steel trade, and sectoral output and average cost of the United States and its trading partners, with particular attention to those of Japan, China, Korea and Taiwan. The results suggest that the U.S. welfare marginally increased during the two years when the safeguards were in effect because of an improvement in the terms of trade. By contrast, the safeguards had a small negative impact on U.S. real GDP. Japan, Korea and Taiwan incurred some welfare losses, but they were extremely small. China did not suffer any welfare losses. U.S. steel imports from the Northeast Asian countries declined by 9-25 percent, but those from the NAFTA partners and other countries on the exclusion list increased by 10-11 percent, largely offsetting the reductions in the total U.S. steel imports. The safeguards caused output contraction in the steel-consuming industries in the United States and output expansion in those industries in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, but these effects were again extremely small. These results suggest that the impact of U.S. safeguards was minimal. (2003) estimate that the safeguards increased the average domestic steel price in the United States 1 In the tariff-rate quota scheme, a given tariff rate is applied to imports up to a specified quantity (i.e., the quota), and then a higher tariff rate is applied to imports over the quota. 
Introduction
In the last three and a half decades, the U.S. steel industry has been protected by a variety of import relief measures, including voluntary restraint agreements (VRAs), the trigger price mechanism (TPM), and antidumping and countervailing duties. The imposition of safeguard measures in March 2002 on 11 steel product categories in the forms of higher tariffs and tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) 1 was the latest of a series of U.S.
protection of its steel industry and escalated the efforts of the U.S. government to restrict steel imports. 2 The safeguards were not imposed on the NAFTA trading partners (Canada and Mexico), nor the great majority of developing countries. Some of the developing countries that were not exempted included China, Korea and Brazil, which are major steel producers in the world. 3 The U.S. government intended to impose the safeguard measures The recent U.S. protection policy might have temporarily reduced its steel imports from the Northeast Asian countries, the European Union (EU) and other non-exempt countries. At the same time, the U.S. action has harmed its automobile, heavy equipment, construction and other steel-consuming industries by raising the cost of intermediate input (e.g., Francois and Baughman, 2001; USITC, 2003) . Hufbauer and Goodrich (2003) estimate that the safeguards increased the average domestic steel price in the United States by 3.3 percent. Francois and Baughman (2001) suggest that the provision of import relief remedies for steel would impose cost of $1.9-4.0 billion a year on consumers and reduce U.S. national income by $500 million to $1.4 billion a year. U.S. steel producers would gain $242-496 million, but these gains would not re-establish the U.S. steel industry to be profitable. USITC (2003) estimates that the effect of the safeguards using a static singlecountry computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and finds that the aggregate effect ranges from a welfare gain of $65.6 million to a welfare loss of $110.0 million, with a central estimate of a welfare loss of $41.6 million. It also estimates that the capital income of the steel industry would increase by $240 million (3.03 percent) and that of the steelconsuming industries would decrease by $601 million (0.01 percent).
Using a dynamic multi-country CGE model, we evaluate the effects of U.S.
safeguards on economic welfare, real GDP, steel trade, sectoral output and unit cost of the United States and its trading partners, with particular attention to those of Japan, China, Korea and Taiwan, over the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . Unlike the model used by USITC (2003) that can only evaluate the aggregate and sectoral effects within the United States, our model can assess the effects on U.S. trading partners. In addition, by using a dynamic model, we can more accurately specify the safeguard duties that are different between the first and second year. The next section provides the trends in U.S. steel imports by trading partners during the period. An overview of the model is given in section 3, followed by a brief description of the scenario in section 4. Assessments of general equilibrium effects of the U.S. safeguards are provided in section 5. The final section summarizes the main findings of this paper. 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 
Trends in U.S. Steel Imports by Trading

Overview of the Model
The model used in this study is a dynamic global CGE model developed by van der Mensbrugghe (2001) . In the base model, all sectors are assumed to be perfectly competitive and operate under constant returns to scale. However, we later relax these assumptions by specifying imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale in the steel industry. Production in each sector is modeled by a series of nested CES production functions, which are intended to represent the different substitution and complementarity relations across various inputs in each sector. The CES nests for production archetype in goods and services other than crops and livestock are depicted in Figure 2 . At the top nest, production is formed by the combination of aggregate intermediate demand other than energy (ND) and value added plus energy (VA). The second nest consists of two nodes.
The first node decomposes aggregate intermediate demand into sectoral demand for goods and services. The second node decomposes VA between demand for labor (L) and demand for human capital, physical capital, energy and sector-specific factor composite (HKTE).
The third and subsequent nodes are decomposed by a similar fashion, as illustrated in Labor can have three different skill levels: unskilled, skilled and highly skilled.
The first two are substitutable and combined in a CES aggregation function as a single labor bundle. Highly skilled labor is combined with capital to form a physical plus human capital bundle.
In each period, the supply of primary factors-capital, labor and land-is generally predetermined. The supply of land is assumed to be sensitive to the contemporaneous price of land, however. Land is assumed to be partially mobile across agricultural sectors.
Thus rates of return are sector-specific, but sectoral land supply reacts to changes in relative rates of return. Some of the natural resource sectors also have a sector-specific factor whose contemporaneous supply is price sensitive. The model includes adjustment
rigidities. An important feature is the distinction between old and new capital goods. In addition, capital is assumed to be partially mobile, reflecting differences in the marketability of capital goods across sectors. Labor and population growth are exogenous.
Labor within each skill category is perfectly mobile across sectors.
All income generated by economic activity is assumed to be distributed to consumers. A single representative consumer (or household) allocates optimally his/her disposable income among the consumer goods and saving. The consumption/saving decision is static: saving is treated as a good and its amount is determined simultaneously with the demands for the other goods. The price of saving is set arbitrarily equal to the average price of consumer goods. Investment is driven by aggregate saving, or the sum of household, government and foreign savings. We assume that foreign saving is exogenous and that the ratio of government expenditures to GDP remains constant in each region over time.
Products are differentiated by region of origin and modeled as imperfect substitutes.
On the import side, this is reflected by the implementation of the so-called Armington assumption, where a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) specification is used to incorporate imperfect substitution of imported goods with respect to domestically produced goods. A symmetric specification is used to model export supply, the latter being implemented with constant elasticity of transformation (CET) functions. Trade measures are fully bilateral and include both export and import taxes/subsidies. Trade and transport margins are also included; therefore world prices reflect the difference between FOB and CIF pricing.
The model is calibrated to a given baseline from 1997 to 2005. The per capita GDP growth rates are broadly consistent with the World Bank's forecast. Productivity is calibrated in the baseline to achieve the desired GDP trends. Several assumptions underline the calibration of productivity. Agricultural productivity is exogenous, userdetermined and varies across regions. Manufacturing productivity growth is assumed to be higher than services productivity growth. An economywide productivity factor is calibrated to achieve the given GDP target, and productivity growth is assumed to be labor-augmenting. In the alternative specification, we model the steel industry to be imperfectly competitive by introducing a price markup over average cost. Increasing returns are calibrated to a cost disadvantage ratio given by
where AC, MC, FC and TC are average, marginal, fixed and total costs, respectively. For illustrative purpose, we set both the price markup and cost disadvantage ratio to be 5 percent.
Two caveats should be borne in mind when we evaluate the effects of U.S. steel protection in the next section. First, as noted above, we later relax the assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale for the steel industry, but imperfect competition is based on a simple specification where the price markup is exogenous.
Although it is more realistic to assume that there are strategic interactions among the firms, it is extremely difficult to model them in a general equilibrium framework. Second, the model assumes full utilization of capital, which is probably not a reasonable assumption.
There appears to be significant overcapacity of steel production in many countries. 8 When capital is fully utilized, an increase in output of steel raises the rental rate of capital, 7 See Dimaranan and McDougall (2002) for detailed descriptions of the GTAP database, version 5.
thereby increasing the marginal cost of production in the steel industry. By contrast, when capital is considerably underutilized, an increase in output is unlikely to raise the rental rate of capital. In other words, the greater the extent of underutilization of capital, the smaller will be an increase in the marginal cost (or the larger will be a reduction in the marginal cost under increasing returns to scale) resulting from an expansion of output.
Thus, the costs of protection are likely to become lower in countries where steel output increases, whereas they are likely to become higher in countries where steel output contracts. hot-rolled sheets, cold-rolled sheets and coated sheets), hot-rolled bar, cold-finished bar and tin mill products. 9 However, because the safeguards were terminated in December 2003, the measures for the first two years are listed in Table 2 . In order to assess the consequences of the safeguard measures, it is necessary to compute their tariff equivalents on U.S. imports of iron and steel [Standard International
Policy Scenario
Trade Classification (SITC) sector 67] because the GTAP database does not provide data on more disaggregated steel products. We compute an increase in the tariff rate on steel imports from region r as follows:
where ∆t r,t is the average increase in the U.S. tariff rate on imports of iron and steel from region r in year t, θ r,i is the share of r's steel product category i in total U.S. steel imports from region r in 2000, and ∆t i,t is the increase in the tariff rate on product i in year t. Estimates of increases in the U.S. tariff rates on iron and steel (SITC 67) resulting from its safeguard measures are provided in Table 3 . For slabs we assumed that tariff equivalents of TRQs were 2 percent in the first year and 1.5 percent in the second year. It is worth noting that most developing and transitional countries were on the exclusion list.
However, China, Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia were included in the safeguard action. For certain products, some developing and transitional countries were included: Brazil for slabs and flat products; India, Thailand and Romania for carbon flanges; Moldova, Turkey and Venezuela for rebar; and Thailand for welded pipe.
Quantitative Assessments of the U.S. Safeguards
In sections 5.1-5.3 below, the effects of the U.S. safeguards are evaluated using the base model with the assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale in all industries. In section 5.4, we relax these assumptions for the steel industry and compare the results obtained under increasing returns with those obtained under constant returns. 
Effects on Economic
where E represents the expenditure function to achieve utility level u given a vector of prices p (superscript b represents baseline levels, and p the post-reform levels). The model uses the extended linear expenditure system (ELES), which incorporates savings in the consumer's utility function (Lluch, 1973; Howe, 1975) . The ELES expenditure function is easy to evaluate at each point in time.
The welfare results are summarized in As expected, most of the non-exempt countries incurred welfare losses. According to our results, the EU was the biggest loser in absolute terms with a reduction in its EV by Europe and the rest of the world were smaller than the gains in their EVs.
Overall, the effects of U.S. steel protection on economic welfare and real GDP were estimated to be extremely small. This might be partly caused by the fact that the volume of imports affected by the U.S. protection is quite small relative to the world trade, but it also highlights how small the steel industry is in economic terms. The results might also explain why there are relatively few complaints about the costs of protectionism in the steel industry. The percentage changes in U.S. steel imports by trading partner are highly correlated with the changes in the U.S. tariff rates on steel imports summarized in Table 3 .
Effects on Trade Flows
The tariff equivalents of the U.S. safeguard measures were estimated to be highest in Korea, followed by Taiwan, the EU, Japan, other OECD, the former Soviet Union and China. The projected percent reductions in U.S. imports relative to the baseline in 2003
were largest (in absolute terms) for Korea (-25%), followed by Taiwan (-22%), the EU (-19%), Japan (-17%), other OECD (-13%), the former Soviet Union (-11%) and China (-9%), the exactly same order as the increases in the U.S. tariff rates on steel by trading partner.
The exclusions of the NAFTA partners and most developing and transitional countries imply that the price of imports from these countries relative to the price of imports from the non-exempt countries for U.S. steel consumers declined in 2002-2003. This led to increases in U.S. imports from Canada and Mexico, Latin America except Brazil, Central and Eastern Europe and the rest of the world by 10-11 percent, thus largely offsetting the fall in the total U.S. steel imports. 11
According to our results, the U.S. safeguards did not induce the Northeast Asian countries to increase their exports to the EU or East Asian markets. Instead, their exports to Canada and Mexico increased slightly. Other than U.S. imports, adjustments in bilateral trade flows were extremely small. In the aggregate, the U.S. steel imports were estimated to decline by 5.9 percent (the last row of Table 6 ). The total steel exports of Japan, China, Korea and Taiwan fell by 1.4, 0.2, 1.9 and 0.7 percent, respectively, whereas those of Canada and Mexico, Latin American other than Brazil, Central and Eastern Europe and the rest of the world increased by 0.8, 1.1, 0.1 and 0.6 percent, respectively (the last column of Table 6 ). Thus, although the safeguards affected U.S. bilateral trade with its trading partners significantly, their effect on global trade was limited.
Effects on Sectoral Output and Average Cost
The impact of the U.S. safeguard measures is expected to vary significantly across sectors. In particular, the industries that use steel intensively as an intermediate input are
likely to be adversely affected by the safeguard duties. To what extent the steel-consuming industries in the United States and the Northeast Asian countries have been affected by the U.S. safeguards is of great concerns to policy makers in these countries.
11 Although the safeguard duties were imposed on imports of the designated steel products from Malaysia and those of carbon flanges from Thailand, tariff equivalents of the safeguard measures for the ASEAN countries were quite low. Thus, the relative price of imports from ASEAN also declined, and the resulting effect on U.S. steel imports from ASEAN was positive. According to our results, the U.S. safeguards caused output contractions in the metal products, general machinery, motor vehicles, other transport equipment and construction sectors in the United States although the impact on these industries was extremely small. By contrast, it led to output expansions in the steel-consuming industries other than construction in Japan, China, Korea and Taiwan, even though the impact was again very small.
The effects on output of the steel-consuming industries were largely attributable to changes in their average costs. Table 8 presents the effects on average costs of steel and the downstream industries resulting from the U.S. safeguards. In the United States, the average costs of steel-consuming industries rose mainly because the price of steel increased. On the contrary, the average costs of the same industries in the non-exempt countries fell. Had the United States covered a much wider range of steel products or set considerably higher tariff rates, they might have lead to significant deteriorations in the international competitiveness of U.S. steel-consuming industries. 
Increasing Returns to Scale
In any CGE models, simulation results are sensitive to the assumptions of the model. For example, previous studies (e.g., Harris, 1984; Brown and Stern, 1989; Francois and Roland-Holst, 1997) have shown that the gains from trade liberalization could be significantly larger when some of the sectors are characterized by imperfect competition and scale economies. Thus, the costs of the U.S. safeguards are likely to become higher if we relax the assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale (CRS) and instead incorporate imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale (IRS) into the model. Table 9 summarizes the results on economic welfare, real GDP, and U.S. steel imports under CRS and IRS in the steel industry. In the latter case, a 5 percent price markup over average cost and the cost disadvantage ratio (see equation 1) of 5 percent are introduced in the steel industry. In all the other industries, we still maintain the assumptions of perfect competition and CRS. Note: CRS is the base model with perfect competition and constant returns to scale in all industries, whereas IRS introduces a 5 percent price markup over average cost and the cost disadvantage ratio of 5 percent in the steel industry. Source: Simulation experiments.
As expected, the magnitudes of changes in economic welfare are generally larger under IRS than under CRS. An absolute change in steel output becomes greater when marginal cost declines with output. Thus, in countries where steel output expands (e.g., the United States, Canada and Mexico), larger increases in steel production have a positive effect on real GDP even though the change in real GDP is still negative in the United
States because of output contractions in the steel-consuming sectors. Combined with the improvements in the terms of trade for these countries, the welfare gains would become larger for the United States and the countries that were exempted from the U.S.
safeguards. 12 By contrast, in countries where steel output contracts (e.g., Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the EU), greater reductions in steel output have a negative effect on real GDP.
Combined with the deteriorations in the terms of trade for most of these countries, the welfare losses would become greater for most of the non-exempt countries. Because additional losses in economic welfare and real GDP are greater than additional gains in these variables under IRS, the world as a whole would incur greater welfare and real GDP losses from the U.S. safeguards when the steel industry is characterized by imperfect competition and IRS (the last row of Table 9 ).
Changes in U.S. imports of steel by trading partner are also magnified under IRS.
For example, the reductions in imports from the Northeast Asian countries would increase from 9-25 percent under CRS to 11-30 percent under IRS. Similarly, U.S. imports from Canada and Mexico would increase from 10 percent to 13 percent.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has provided quantitative assessments of the temporary U.S. safeguards was characterized by imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale, the effects became larger, but still extremely small in percentage terms. These results suggest that the impact of the U.S. safeguards was minimal.
The magnitudes of our results are significantly smaller than those obtained by Francois and Baughman (2001) , who estimated that U.S. GDP would fall by $500 million to $1.4 billion. This was because they evaluated the effects of the imposition of 9.2-20.7 percent tariffs on steel imports, which were of much higher tariff rates than used in our study. They also included only Canada and Mexico on the exclusion list although the great majority of developing countries were excluded from the U.S. safeguards.
In this paper, we attempted to estimate the impact of the temporary safeguards that were in effect in [2002] [2003] . Thus, no attempts were made to assess the effects of the protection of U.S. steel industry that existed prior to 2002, which were much more substantial and long-lasting. The effects of the safeguards were likely to be extremely small as we estimated, but the past U.S. protection policies might have had substantial effects on the bilateral trade flows in steel, as well as the efficiency and competitiveness of the steel and the steel-consuming industries in the United States and Northeast Asia.
